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Abstract 
The paper examines the social and political dynamics of Chinese migrants in Africa. 
Implicit in much of the literature on ‘China in Africa’ is a power relation in which the 
Chinese hold the whip hand. Moreover analytical attention has focussed 
overwhelmingly on aggregate ‘South-South’ flows of trade or FDI, or bilateral projects 
as opposed to the activities of the myriad independent Chinese entrepreneurs that have 
migrated to Africa. While we do not want to reverse the structuralist lens to say that 
Africa/ns have endless options we want to examine how African social and political 
agency plays into these unfolding relationships. Our argument is that the increased 
Chinese presence in Africa does not represent some form of harmonious ‘South-South’ 
cooperation but Africans are managing the relationship in ways that create significant 
opportunities for their development. Based on recent fieldwork in Angola, Ghana, and 
Nigeria, the paper addresses a number of key dimensions around the governance of this 
migration. Our data show African state institutions, firms and individuals contesting and 
shaping these engagements in ways that benefit them. Much of the relationship is 
brokered, and subsequently governed, by pacts between Chinese and African elite state 
actors. These tend to be relatively unaccountable and non-transparent processes with the 
Chinese investments bolstering the legitimacy of African regimes.  These relationships 
are presented by the Chinese as ‘win-win’ and not interfering in domestic political 
processes, yet they do intervene and increasingly so in contexts where security of 
investments and personnel are threatened. This was amply demonstrated in the recent 
Libyan evacuation though this only covered labour migrants on official contracts and 
not independent migrants. That said where the quality of Chinese investment is held to 
account by African states and civil societies we generally see better developmental 
impacts. Central to much of this are the differences in the national laws and 
enforcement regimes of the ‘host’ societies, around labour, immigration and investment. 
This holds a potential lesson for managing ‘China-Africa’ relations in that a strong 
legislative base with effective enforcement can deliver development dividends from 
small scale investments besides the big infrastructure projects heralded in the press. 
Beyond these more formal inter-state relations we see migration and investment 
governed in a number of informal ways, notably organisations such as local associations 
of market traders. It is often these forms of agency that spark the formal governance 
system into action. Many successful Chinese firms have local patrons who give 
credibility, contacts and protection. We have evidence of African firms employing 
Chinese labour, expertise and technology. African entrepreneurs actively encouraging 
Chinese investment outside of the formal, bilateral arrangements drive some of this. In 
this sense governance of Chinese-African migration is national and/or informal rather 
than regional. 
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Introduction: Bilateralism and Beyond in China-Africa 
Relations 
 
This paper focuses on Chinese migrants in Africa and is inspired by Alden’s comment 
that “The behaviour of thousands of newly settled Chinese businessmen and the conduct 
of the African communities in which they live and work will matter as much as the 
diplomacy and concessions made at the government level” (Alden 2007: 128). To date 
much of the focus on China in Africa has been on the diplomatic efforts and their 
relationship to a mutually enriching ‘South-South’ cooperation.  Notably, meetings like 
the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) are rightly seen as central to the 
official foreign policy of China in Africa (Taylor 2011). Yet, as Alden indicates, there is 
much more to South-South flows than high-level politicking and concessional financing 
for big infrastructures projects.  
 
Even though the Chinese government frequently sponsors engagements with African 
nations, independent migrants also settled in a number of African countries, in tandem 
with the positive diplomatic relations. In absolute numbers, the percentages of Chinese 
migrants to Africa are relatively small, when compared to all emigration from China 
(IOM 2010). Still, the growing presence of Chinese workers and business people in 
Africa precipitated questions as to whether their presence is beneficial through such 
things as enhancing entrepreneurial activity or whether the inexpensive goods they 
bring and the infrastructure they build in order to access natural resources constitute a 
new ‘imperialism’ that exploits Africa. 
 
In terms of the governance of these migration flows there is very little systematic data. 
Most of the work has focused on the aid-governance nexus where the Chinese are 
accused by some of unscrupulous behaviour that undermines good governance (Tull 
2006). Yet there is much more to the governance issue than whether Chinese lending 
supports authoritarian regimes or if investment comes without consideration of human 
rights (see Gu et al. 2008). The paper argues that these new migration flows from China 
to Africa are significant given that they are made up of state-sponsored construction 
teams or independent entrepreneurs, all of which make significant economic impacts on 
host societies. Yet the governance of these flows is not coherent or planned. Rather, a 
range of different actors are involved in the governance of this migration and they 
operate through informal and formal modes of regulation. Crucially, in contrast to 
analyses that attribute power to China at the expense of Africa we argue that African 
social and political agency is central to the governance of these relationships. These 
relationships also exceed bilateral arrangements and are often a multi-layered and/or 
networked phenomenon.  
 
The paper starts by trying to make sense of the limited data on the scale of this 
migration. This discussion highlights the need for disaggregation of flows according to 
the motives and actors involved. In turn this sets up a consideration of the historical 
drivers of this migration, the different actors involved, and some of the theories used to 
explain the social and political underpinnings of these relationships. We then examine 
the specific nature of the governance in place, which is often bilateral and 
unaccountable, but also takes place through less bounded relationships and is 
increasingly influenced by a range of civil society actors. 
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Dubious Data 
 
But how significant is this China-Africa migration? While most observers accept that 
China sent an increased number of workers to Africa, particularly in the last decade, a 
major problem is that data are speculative (see Figure 1). Notwithstanding, these data 
lend themselves to several interpretations. First, data shows that sizeable, long-standing 
Chinese migrant communities in South Africa and Mauritius date back to the colonial 
period and that more recent immigration consisted of 1980s arrivals from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. 1  Second, the data also shows that the rapid increases in Chinese 
immigration to Africa over the past seven years coincide not only with the China’s 
increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), but also with China’s trade with various 
African countries. The Xinhua Press Agency estimated that as many as 750,000 Chinese 
may be working or living in Africa for extended periods.2 The most significant growth 
is found in countries with significant oil resources, notably Nigeria, Angola and Sudan.  
 
 
Figure 1: Estimates for Chinese in selected African countries, various sources. 
^Zhang5; QiaoQing (2005); + Sautman and Hairong6; * Poston et al.7; ** Poston et al.8; 
*** Abdalla Ali9  
                                                 
1 Anshan Li, Chinese diaspora in Africa (Bejing: Peking University Centre on Overseas Chinese, 2005)  
2 Howard French and Lydia Polgreen, “Chinese flocking in numbers to a new frontier: Africa.” 
International Herald Tribune, August 17th 2007. http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/17/ 
news/malawi.php 
3 Sautman and Hairong, “Friends and Interests”. 
4 Sautman and Hairong, “Friends and Interests”. 
5 W Zhang, HuaqiaoHuaRenGaiShu, (Beijing: Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, CCP, 
1993).  
Country  1963  
(Chang 
1968) 
2000, unless ^ 
for 1989 
(Chinese 
sources) 
2001  
(Ohio U. 
Database, cited 
in Sautman3 
Estimate for 
2003-2007 
(Sautman and 
Hairong 4  plus 
various) 
South Africa 5105 70000 30000* 100000-400000 
(2007)+ 
Mauritius 23266 40000 35000 (for year 
1990)** 
30000 (2005)+ 
Cameroon  N/A 450 50  1000-3000 (2005)+  
Sudan  N/A 45^ 45  5000-10000 (2004-
2005)***  
Lesotho  N/A 2500 1000  5000 (2005)+  
Ghana  N/A 465 500  6000 (2004)+  
Liberia  27 45^ 120  600 (2006)+  
Nigeria  2 10000 2000  100000 (2007) 
Mozambique  1735 500 700  1500 (2006)+  
Ethiopia  18 8 100  3000-4000 (2006)+  
Algeria  N/A 30 2000  8000 (2003)+  
Cote 
d’Ivoire  
N/A 1300 200  10000 (2007)+  
Zimbabwe  303 500 300  10000 (2007)+  
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This paucity of reliable data raises three further issues. First, history is crucial to 
understanding the periodization of migration and its relationships to economic and 
geopolitical forces. Second, we need to focus on the social and geographical 
characteristics of migrants, especially on those differences within sub-communities of 
overseas Chinese.10 A third concern, which arises from the previous issue, is how the 
specific historical environments and current cultural settings impact the Chinese migrant 
community and their developmental activities. We examine these three issues in more 
detail before turning to an analysis of the governance of these flows. 
 
Disaggregating Flows Across Time and Space  
 
This section picks up these arguments around needing a finer grained analysis of the 
historical drivers of China-Africa migration, the dynamic nature of Chinese 
‘communities’ in Africa, and the relationships between migrants and political processes.  
 
Histories of China-Africa migration 
 
For some, China’s growing presence in Africa is a relatively new phenomenon that is 
likened to an opportunistic resource grab (Mawdsley 2008). Such an analysis is flawed 
to the extent that it overlooks the long history of contact and support between the 
peoples of these regions. Even though this paper focuses on more recent Chinese 
migration to Africa, these movements connect to longer histories of South-South 
migration, which in some cases go back over centuries.  
 
The sweeping concept South-South migration also obscures layers of historical and 
geographical complexity. This concept, for example, fails to challenge conventional 
definitions of the South.11 The common sense definition has no meaning even if we can 
now, i.e., ex post, label the South. If South denotes a lack of development, many of 
these regions were not less developed when the migrations took place. Chinese traders 
first engaged with East Africa in the fifteenth century or earlier (Li 2012), when China 
was in absolute and relative terms far more developed than a great many 
contemporaneous European regions.12 Therefore, historical perspective remains critical 
to any effort to calculate the significance of present South-South flows. 
 
These longer histories are important because, in some contexts, they set up patterns of 
migration that continue today.  For example, the coolie labour of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century gave rise to Chinese communities that, to an extent, anchored 
subsequent migrants. However, there is no necessary path dependency in these 
                                                                                                                                               
6 Sautman and Hairong, “Friends and Interests”. 
7 Dudley Poston Jr., Michael Mao, and Mei-Yu Yu, “The Global Distribution of the Overseas Chinese 
Around 1990.” Population and Development Review 20(3) (1994). Put the number in 1993 at 36,000 
8 Poston et al, “Overseas Chinese”  
9 Ali Abdalla Ali, “The political economy of relations between Sudan and China,” in China in Africa: 
Mercantilist predator of partner in development? ed. Garth Le Pere (Braamfontein: Institute for Global 
Dialogue and South African Institute for International Affairs, 2007). Puts the number in 2004 at 24,000 
10 Xiang Biao, Promoting Knowledge Exchange through diaspora networks: The case of the PRC (Oxford: 
University of Oxford Compas Report, 2005). http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports /GCF/reta6117-
prc.pdf.  
11 Bakewell, South-South Migration. 
12 Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the 
Western World (London: Allen Lane, 2009).  
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migration flows since old and new Chinese migrants do not always interact. This 
apparent alienation cautions against homogenizing the Chinese and urges us to look at 
the forces driving emigration from China.13  
 
As recently as the eighteenth century, China’s policies purposefully discouraged 
outbound migration. 14 These policies changed, however, with the Opium Wars that 
enabled colonial powers to reduce restrictions on Chinese emigration. These changes 
precipitated large-scale, overseas movements of Chinese labourers in the purported 
coolie trade.15,16 Even though historians exaggerate the impact of the coolie trade as the 
paradigm of Chinese migration, most of these labour contracts were tightly regulated 
and workers were sent back after their contracts expired. Small, but enterprising groups 
of independent traders, based in China, serviced these labour migrants and also engaged 
in small-scale export.17  
 
In 1949 the newly founded People’s Republic of China (PRC) reversed these policies 
and officially ended outbound emigration. The defeated Kuomintang withdrew to 
Taiwan and established the Republic of China (ROC, commonly known as Taiwan). 
Taiwan is important because many Taiwanese firms operate in Africa whereas the PRC, 
which has given its One China demand unswerving priority since Taiwan’s creation, 
offers favourable aid terms to African countries that support its claims to Taiwan. The 
Cold War’s geopolitical strategy in Africa found China challenging the major 
superpowers through its conspicuous targeting of aid.18 Between the 1960s and the early 
1980s at least 150,000 Chinese technical assistants arrived in Africa.19 Although the 
numbers of aid workers were not huge, and many stayed only temporarily, significant 
amounts remained behind to pursue commercial activities.20 At the same time, China’s 
domestic perception of Overseas Chinese shifted from a view that they were traitors to a 
view that cast them as new vanguards of Third World anti-colonialism.21  
 
China’s more recent emigration patterns occurred in the wake of that nation’s 1970s 
economic reforms that some observers believe weakened the state’s role in its peoples’ 
movements.22 The economic reforms included the total or partial privatisation of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and latterly encouraged a globalization strategy that 
stimulated foreign investment. On top of this the Chinese assumed a neutral attitude 
towards emigration, and attempted to divorce out bound migration from geopolitical and 
                                                 
13 Janet Wilhelm, “The Chinese Communities in South Africa.” In State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-
2006 ed. Sakhela Buhlungu et al (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006). 
14 Simon Shen, “A constructed (un)reality on China's re-entry into Africa: the Chinese online community 
perception of Africa (2006–2008),” The Journal of Modern African Studies 47 (2009).  
15 Sen-Dou Chang, “The Distribution and Occupations of Overseas Chinese.”  Geographical Review 58/1 
(1968). 
16 Yoon Park, “Sojourners to Settlers: Early Constructions of Chinese Identity in South Africa, 1879-
1949,” African Studies 65/2 (2006). 
17 Lynn Pan, The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 
2005).  
18 Deborah Brautigam, Chinese Aid and African Development: Exporting Green Revolution (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan and New York: St Martins, 1998). 
19 Brautigam, Chinese Aid. 
20 Elizabeth Hsu, “Zanzibar and its Chinese Communities,” Population, Space and Place. 13 (2007). 
21 Mette Thuno, “Reaching Out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas: The Trans-territorial Scope of the 
PRC by the End of the twentieth Century,” The China Quarterly 168 (2001). 
22 Thuno, “Reaching Out”, Biao Xiang “Emigration from China:  A Sending Country Perspective.” 
International Migration 41/3 (2003). 
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ideological concerns.23 China’s populous provinces saw the government allow private 
labour recruitment projects to be deregulated, and simultaneously allow the number of 
private labour contractors to grow.24 African nations saw an inflow of cheap Chinese 
manufactures headed for local markets.  Africa received private traders, and waves of 
independent workers migrated to Africa for economic reasons. Additionally, large 
numbers of state-sponsored construction teams and labourers came to work in the 
extractive industries.25 Yet we must avoid treating a dynamic flow as only driven by 
changes in China. African social and political agency mediates these flows in important 
ways. 
 
Diverse drivers, multiple communities 
 
In order to understand the motives for Chinese migration we need a broad political 
economy perspective. This means acknowledging that capital is fragmented so that state 
activity and politics cannot be homogenized by reducing them to the needs of a 'unitary' 
capital. In terms of China’s heightened role in Africa, an important differentiating factor 
is the scale and type of Chinese enterprise. We find three distinct groups.  
 
First, temporary labour migrants are generally associated with large infrastructure 
projects.26,27 Often the World’s thirst for oil drives the need for such large numbers of 
foreign workers, even though the Chinese also engage in non-oil mineral resources.  
These projects are located near to Chinese personnel, who live in compounds, and have 
little contact with indigenous African communities. 28   For the most part, these 
compounds consist of Chinese expatriates on fixed term contracts, who return home 
after a few years.29 This approach suggests that, whether intentionally or otherwise, 
China’s policies have created an enclave for these labourers.30  
 
A second group of Chinese migrants to Africa consists of petty entrepreneurs, who 
usually work in trade, services and light manufacturing, but lack government backing.31 
Researchers analysed the economic integration of Chinese migrant entrepreneurs 
through a construct of embeddedness, which argues that economic practices are 
embedded in social practices.32,33 While Greenhalgh cautions against inclinations that 
superimpose a Confucian ethic upon all Chinese business organizations, ethnic 
communities can function as a “market for culturally defined goods, a pool of reliable 
                                                 
23 Biao, “Emigration”. 
24 Monina Wong, “Chinese workers in the garment industry in Africa: Implications of the contract labour 
dispatch system on the international labour movement,” Labour, Capital and Society 39/1 (2006). 
25 Broadman, Silk Road. 
26 Ma Mung, “Chinese Migration”. 
27 Centre for Chinese Studies, China’s interest and activity in Africa’s construction and Infrastructure 
sectors  (Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University, 2007). 
28 Lucy Corkin, “Chinese Migrants to Africa: A Historical Overview.” The China Monitor 26 (2008). 
29 Broadman, Silk Road. 
30 James Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2006).  
31 Heidi Haugen and Jurgen Carling, “On the Edge of the Chinese Diaspora: The Surge of Baihuo Business 
in an African City,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28/4 (2005).  
32  Giles Mohan, “The underdevelopment of economic geography: rethinking institutions and 
embeddedness in a Third World context,” in Social capital and the embedded enterprise: international 
perspectives, ed. by Mike Taylor and Simon Leonard (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). 
33 Sharon Zukin and Paul DiMaggio, “Introduction,” in Structures of capital: The social organization of the 
economy, ed. by Sharon Zukin and Paul DiMaggio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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low-wage labour and a potential source of start-up capital."34,35 These Chinese traders 
tend to live frugal lifestyles, rely on some family labour, and buy from China.36 Their 
flexible use of networks offers a plausible explanation for their ability to out-compete 
African firms. 37  Part of this network-driven flexibility is apparent in strategies for 
geographical movements, expansion and diversification.38 To add to these causal factors, 
some smaller manufacturing firms engage agencies to recruit low-wage Chinese 
labour.39  
 
The third source of Chinese migrants is undocumented migrants who purposefully 
evade state surveillance. An unknown number of illegal sojourners use African states as 
soft locations, where they enjoy respites from their quests to enter North America or 
Europe. 40  These migrants may become petty traders to remain solvent, rather than 
engage in the longer-term strategy of becoming embedded in African economies.  
 
The prevailing impetus for each of these groups is economic. Most Chinese respondents 
in Ghana and Angola saw their African stay as more lucrative than life in China. SOE 
workers found that overseas wages were two or three times those in China, and seldom 
did local goods and services require large expenditures. Private businessmen saw Africa 
as an opportunity, especially after the recent financial crisis hit China’s economy. A 
Chinese businessman in Ghana explained that, 
 
I don’t think I will be able to make more money in China than I can do here. The 
conditions in China are getting quite bad, and will be worse with this world 
crisis. I will stay overseas and support my family until my son has graduated. 
Wow, that’s like another 15 years (sigh).41  
 
One respondent noted of Angola “This place is like China, very undeveloped in the past 
but now is the time…It is always the first pot that is most profitable.” 42  Some 
respondents acknowledged that, due to the civil war, Angola needed infrastructure and 
commodities and that the Chinese are adroit at spotting opportunities in post-conflict 
countries, for projects in basic reconstruction and for the sale of goods. The implication 
is that migration to the developing world may increase, by acting as a vent for China’s 
domestic underemployment.  
 
But within these ‘Chinese’ groups there were internal differences.  In our research in 
Ghana we found that Chinese migrants tended to organize around age and place of 
origin. 43  More specifically, the younger Shanghai crowd socialized together and 
apparently differentiated themselves from the older Hong Kongers. The younger crowd 
                                                 
34 Susan Greenhalgh, “De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm.” American Ethnologist, 21/4 (1994). 
35 Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, “Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social 
Determinants of Economic Action,” American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1329 
36 Gregor Dobler, “Solidarity, Xenophobia and the Regulation of Chinese Businesses in Namibia” in China 
Returns to Africa: A rising power and a continent embrace, ed. Chris Alden et al. (London: Hurst, 2008). 
37 Brautigam, “Close encounters”. 
38 Haugen and Carling, “On the Edge”.  
39 Wong, “Chinese workers”. 
40 Ma Mung, “Chinese Migration”. 
41 Anonymous interview from research project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council 
(Ref: RES 062-23-1893). Interview code: Ghana16anon, conducted 9/12/08 
42 Anonymous interview from research project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council 
(Ref: RES 062-23-1893). Interview code: Angola 27anon, conducted 6/5/09 
43 Anonymous interview data from research project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research 
Council (Ref: RES 062-23-1893). 
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tended to organize through a Ghana-centred Chinese language website and through QQ 
discussion groups. 44   Moreover, with regard to Ghana, Ho concludes that formal 
organization is generally less important than informal sociality. He talks about the 
divisions within the ‘Chinese’ community in Ghana and argues, “[T]heir [the migrant 
Chinese] social bonds are loose and uneasy and their idea of belonging to a place and 
group is fluid”. 45  He shows how suspicion and distrust often define business 
relationships between the Chinese, who harbour a sense of transitioning and of 
continuing to sojourn.  
 
This contradicts the purported model of Confucian capitalism, in which family firms 
allegedly rely on guanxi to achieve the goal of increasing the material well-being of 
oneself and one’s family.46 Guanxi is roughly defined as interpersonal connections of 
trust, and networking, all of which are essential to a successful business. Even though a 
successful business must have sufficient guanxi, the importance of these inter-
relationships not only has its limits, but has gendered implications for family and kin.47  
Greenhalgh shows how Taiwanese firms could be seen to exemplify strong, 
interpersonal connections with a dominant patriarchal leader.48 She shows that not only 
is this Confucian ideal a relatively recent invention of tradition to capture low-cost and 
flexible niches in the global economy, but that it relied on the super-exploitation of 
female members of the extended family who were drawn upon for both domestic 
reproduction and productive labour. The point is that there is a capitalist imperative in 
this behaviour and so in analysing migrant flows and behaviours we have to be 
attendant to political economy as much as cultural difference (Dirlik 1997, Meagher 
2012). 
 
Social agency and the mediation of transnational capital 
 
If the dominant literature has, erroneously, focused on the specificities of Chinese 
business culture and the drivers of China’s outward investment, then we need a more 
nuanced understanding of African agency. A third analytical point, then, in 
understanding the governance of Chinese engagement is the role played by African 
actors. Contemporary analyses of China in Africa have much in common with earlier 
debates about dependency, which lacked a sufficiently disaggregated and dynamic view 
of both capitalism and African political agency. As such to understand the governance 
of Chinese migrant flows we need a relational understanding. Mung terms this a 
‘triangular’ perspective in which “the Chinese diaspora does not only relate to China, 
but also interacts with the society where it has settled.”49  We suggest that African 
actors exercise agency within and outside the confines of the state, even as these actions 
are shaped by and in turn shape processes of state formation and function. 
 
Here Hagmann and Peclard have sought to ‘understand how local, national and 
transnational actors forge and remake the state through processes of negotiation, 
                                                 
44 A Chinese instant messaging software 
45 Conal Ho, “The Doing and Undoing of Community: Chinese Networks in Ghana,” China Aktuell 3 
(2008): 53 
46 Arif Dirlik, “Critical reflections on Chinese capitalism as paradigm”, Identities 3(3) 1997.   
Murray Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese Entrepreneurs 
Are Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia (New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1996). 
47 Jinn-Yuh. Hsu and AnnaLee Saxenian, “The limits of quanxi capitalism,” Environment & Planning A 32 
(2000). 
48 Greenhalgh, “De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm”. 
49  Ma Mung, “Chinese Migration”, 105-106 
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contestation and bricolage’. Their ‘analytic of statehood’ is about the dynamic and 
always undetermined process of state (de)construction which is a multi-level 
phenomenon although Doornbos rightly cautions that social demands in Africa are often 
‘negated’ rather than negotiated. Hagmann and Peclard’s framework comprises diverse 
actors, many of whom lie outside formal political structures. What also becomes 
apparent is that there is a strong class and interest-based dimension to political and 
social agency.  In the context of the opportunities and threats raised by China’s entry 
into Africa, civil society action is often – but not exclusively - about protecting the class 
privileges of Africa’s labour aristocracy and petit-bourgeoisie, while the sections of the 
state that benefit from (and so fight for) Chinese investment are often part of a highly 
select elite, as we will see.  
 
Unfolding Governance of China-Africa Migration 
 
So far we have argued that the motives of China’s migrants have varied over time and 
that ethnocentric ideas about ‘the Chinese’ are unhelpful. Moreover, attributing power 
to China/the Chinese at the expense of Africa/ns presents a partial and inaccurate 
picture of how these flows of people, finance and goods are ultimately governed. In this 
section we examine these different modalities for governing China-Africa migration and 
argue that a range of different actors are involved in this governance and they operate 
through informal and formal channels and modes of regulation.  
 
 
Elite bilateralism 
 
In terms of governing these migration flows an important aspect is the closed 
bilateralism of the official relationships. Institutional processes like FOCAC are 
important for setting the terms of much of the official, inter-state transactions. But the 
idea that this is a pan-African forum is a misnomer insofar as most of the concrete deals 
that are made with Africa are on bilateral terms, which follows a pattern that the 
Chinese (and many other East Asian donors) established during the cold war period.  
 
Where studies drill down into these bilateral relationships the analysis invariably 
focuses on state elites. Carmody et al (2012) conclude their study of China and Zambia 
by arguing that the relationship is ‘based on an (il)liberal bargain between domestic and 
Chinese political elites’ (p.225) in which closed door negotiations largely bypass 
domestic accountability mechanisms, such as Parliaments. A similar pattern to Zambia 
pervades China’s relations with Angola. Angola’s post-war economy required huge 
amounts of social and infrastructural investment and so external financing was sought. 
It was here that China, in need of energy resources, offered Angola a series of oil-
backed credit lines with little conditionality. In the first official estimate of Chinese 
credit to Angola, the Chinese Ambassador said in early 2011 that US$14.5 billion in 
credit had been provided since the end of the war from the three Chinese state banks.  
 
Project proposals identified as priorities by the Angolan ministries are put forward a 
joint committee (the GTC) of Angola’s Ministry of Finance and China’s Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM). Implementation then passes over to a multisectoral technical 
group (the GAT). For each project put to tender, the Chinese government proposes a 
few Chinese companies while sectoral ministries are in charge of managing these public 
works. Through these arrangements, the Angolan government has used the Chinese 
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credit to undertake well over 100 projects which correspond to its strategy of 
prioritising the (re)construction of other key infrastructure. 
 
Additionally, oil-backed loans amounting to as much as US$10 billion have been 
provided by a private equity firm based in Hong Kong called the China International 
Fund (CIF). Crucially the CIF credit facility has been managed by Angola’s 
Reconstruction Office, the Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN), which has been 
exclusively accountable to the Angolan president. The various Gabinetes founded by 
President Dos Santos have always been personalised vehicles for economic 
management as part of what de Oliveira terms a ‘successful failed state’.  
 
Tied to the original China ExIm Bank loans is the agreement that the public tenders for 
the construction and civil engineering contracts tabled for Angola’s reconstruction will 
be awarded primarily (70 per cent) to Chinese enterprises approved by the Chinese 
government. To date some thirty-five Chinese companies have been pre-approved by 
the PRC government to bid for projects that are put to tender in China (interview with 
SOE general manager). Furthermore, in principle, at least 50 per cent of all procurement 
for China ExIm Bank funded projects (in terms of equipment, materials, technology or 
services) must come from China, but in practice our research shows that most projects 
are implemented at closer to 70 per cent. As a result almost everything down to the 
cement and nails for these works are imported from China ensuring a large portion of 
the loans is redirected to China’s domestic economy. Moreover, there is limited 
evidence that Chinese credit lines are boosting Angola’s productive capacity and the 
limited employment opportunities created for Angolan workers have been the cause of 
some tension locally. Where Angolans have been able to find work on Chinese 
construction sites it has often been as security guards rather than on equal terms as 
waged labourers. 
 
China’s preference for bilateralism encourages negotiations between senior officials 
which often occur outside of domestic accountability structures, suggesting that China’s 
entry may do little to alter existing forms of patrimonialism. That said, the Chinese 
claim that their project focus as opposed to modalities like direct budget support reduces 
the chances of malfeasance since there is less free-floating cash to be siphoned off. 
Again, evidence of such arrangements is sparse and arguably part of the Chinese 
argument is to justify its tying of loans to Chinese SOEs.  
 
But whether these arrangements are elite-based and relatively unaccountable is 
somewhat different to whether they build legitimacy and contribute to a longer-term 
view of development. The infrastructure that the Chinese bring has been used to build 
African regime legitimacy, especially in the run up to elections. The Dos Santos 
government in Angola is a case in point and similar moves were made in Sudan (see 
also Holslag 2011). Conversely, in the case of Zambia, Chinese investment was used 
negatively to build opposition politics and we have seen an increase in expulsions of 
‘illegal’ Chinese migrants in Ghana as the elections heat up.  Hence, Chinese 
investment and migration plays into domestic political debates, which in turn affect the 
levels and nature of this migration. At a geopolitical level the Angola case shows that 
policy triangulation is possible with African states playing donors and investors off 
against one another. But while China may provide enhanced markets for African 
exports they do not alter the structural position of these economies and do little to kick 
start broader industrialisation. It is here that purposive policy on the African side is vital 
if developmental gains are to spread beyond mineral rents. Investment in training, for 
11 
 
example, is important if more local employment is to be generated by this new 
investment. 
 
Playing into these closed and elite bilateral relations are weaknesses in local monitoring 
and enforcement of existing legislation that has a direct bearing on migration such as 
investment, immigration, and labour. For example, Dan Haglund’s work on Zambia 
focuses on ‘the interface between Chinese investors and local regulatory institutions’; 
what he terms ‘political embeddedness’. 50  This is not so much about purposeful 
governance of migration but rather a political vacuum created by weak states and 
politicised bureaucracies. We saw in Ghana that some Chinese investors circumvented 
the local laws; for example, by labelling themselves as ‘wholesalers’ for purposes of 
conforming to the investment code but in practice operating as retailers.  
 
One of the key issues is around the use and rights of African labour. The use of African 
labour varies according to labour market conditions and nature of the project, but that it 
is generally quite high (US Congress/Brautigam 2011) in comparison to the negative 
portrayal of mass importation of Chinese labour. However, much of this African labour 
is relatively unskilled and so skills transfer is low and few African governments are 
investing in vocational training (Okonjo-Iweala 2010), which creates a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of the Chinese requiring the importation of skilled labour. However, we have 
seen companies like Huawei setting up training centres in Africa (Chang et al 2009) as 
it is aware that local workers have certain advantages over Chinese staff, not least cost if 
they are adequately trained. A similar issue is around linkages to local firms. We have 
seen in the cases of Angola and DRC that local content clauses were part of the 
agreements around loan packages but that adherence is uneven. While some see the 
Chinese SEZs as a way of integrating the Chinese value chain to benefit Chinese firms 
there is emerging evidence that Chinese investment is creating local linkages to African 
firms though the jobs created in these firms tend to be relatively low skilled (Teka 2011) 
and in the case of Angola contracts are skewed towards firms owned by the ruling party 
(Soares de Oliveira 2007). These studies also show that local policy can make a 
difference and so while, for example, Angola has set up joint venture clauses that 
encouraged foreign firms to partner with local firms much of the rest of the policy 
needed to kick start industrialisation (such as training) was poorly elaborated.  
 
Informal governance and patronage 
 
Just as many African governments have consciously turned to China as an official 
partner in national development, African citizens have increasingly reached out to China 
as a source of useful resources for personal and business progression. For example, 
Dobler’s work on Namibia mentions town twinning as a semi-formal means of 
encouraging inward Chinese investment and trade.51 Another manifestation of this is 
significant numbers of African traders who, since the mid-1990s, have travelled to 
China, especially Guangzhou, to buy Chinese consumer goods for export to Africa.52 
Significantly, local manufacturers that we interviewed in Ghana and Nigeria often 
                                                 
50 Dan Haglund, ‘Regulating FDI in weak African states: a case study of Chinese copper mining in Zambia’, 
Journal of Modern African Studies 46, 4 (2008), pp. 547-575;  
51 Gregor Dobler, ‘Solidarity, xenophobia and the regulation of Chinese businesses in Namibia’, in Alden, 
Large and Soares de Oliveira (eds), China Returns to Africa, pp. 237-255. 
52 See, for example, Sylvie Bredeloup, ‘African trading post in Guangzhou: emergent or recurrent 
commercial form?’, African Diaspora 5, 1 (2012), pp. 27-50; Michal Lyons, Alison Brown and Li Zhigang, 
‘In the dragon’s den: African traders in Guangzhou’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38, 5 (2012), 
pp. 869-888.   
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argued that it is these African traders in China, rather than Chinese traders in Africa, 
who have been primarily responsible for the massive influx of cheap Chinese goods in 
recent years.53  
 
The forging of connections to China by African traders also appears to be one of the 
factors that have encouraged Chinese entrepreneurs and companies to come to the 
continent. Respondents from Chinese manufacturing companies that have established 
outlets and/or factories in Ghana and Nigeria often remarked that they had first been 
alerted to the West African market by the quantity of orders they received from traders 
from the region. For example, a Chinese entrepreneur who came to Nigeria in 2001 to 
sell textiles and subsequently established a furniture factory in Lagos in 2006 recalls, ‘I 
had a small scale factory in [China] and we knew that Nigeria was a large market 
because Nigerians were importing from my factory […]. So that what was why I knew 
that there’s a market in Nigeria. So I came to Nigeria’.54 
 
Furthermore, we found that Ghanaian and Nigerian entrepreneurs are playing a much 
more direct role in encouraging the Chinese presence by sourcing not only consumer 
goods but also partners, workers and capital goods from China. Among manufacturers 
in the two countries, purchasing relatively cheap machinery from China has become an 
increasingly important way of maintaining production in the face of almost 
prohibitively high costs linked largely to unreliable and expensive power supplies and 
limited transport infrastructure.55 Central to this strategy of taking advantage of more 
affordable Chinese technology is recruiting Chinese technicians to oversee installation 
and train their local counterparts in operating, maintaining and repairing the machinery. 
For example, a Nigerian engineering component manufacturer reported that when he 
replaced his ageing Europe-sourced production lines for half the cost by turning to a 
supplier in China, he also negotiated for nine technicians to be seconded to his Lagos 
factory for six months.56 To assist the Chinese technicians he employed the services of a 
Chinese-speaking Nigerian man who had recently returned to Nigeria with his Chinese 
wife to establish a translation company after studying and working in China for 6 years.  
 
In an important twist to the dominant narrative around Chinese firms importing their 
own labour we found evidence that African companies across a range of sectors 
increasingly view China as a source of skilled and/or hard-working labour and are 
actively bringing over Chinese workers in an attempt to increase productivity and 
provide higher quality goods and services. 57  This evolution in African business 
connections with China is exemplified by Mr Daniel, a Nigerian entrepreneur based in 
Lagos who has employed Chinese staff in a number of his businesses.58 Mr Daniel’s 
furniture business had been based on importing finished furniture from Europe and, 
more recently, China. When the Nigerian government banned the importation of 
                                                 
53 See also, Laurence Marfaing and Alena Thiel, Chinese Commodity Imports in Ghana and Senegal: 
Demystifying Chinese business strength in urban West Africa (Working Paper 180, German Institute of 
Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, 2011). 
54 Interview, Chinese factory owner, Lagos, 20 December 2010. This is our interpreter’s translation from 
the Chinese. 
55 See also, Dulue Mbachu, ‘Nigerian resources: changing the playing field’, South African Journal of 
International Affairs 13, (2006), pp.  77-82. 
56 Interview, Nigerian manufacturer, Lagos, 9 October 2010.  
57 See also, Mario Esteban, ‘A silent invasion? African views on the growing Chinese presence in Africa: 
the case of Equatorial Guinea’, African and Asian Studies 9, 3 (2010), pp. 232-251. 
58 Interview, Mr Daniel, Nigerian businessman, Lagos, 12 October 2010. The names of individuals and 
companies have been changed to protect the identity of respondents. 
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furniture in 2004 he realised his only option was to manufacture locally but he was 
concerned that local labour would not be sufficiently skilled or reliable and that 
expatriate labour from Europe would be far too expensive. Having been impressed by 
the quality of the Chinese furniture he had previously imported, he learned from the 
extensive network of contacts he had established in southern China that Chinese labour 
was ‘cheap’ and able to bear basic living conditions. He therefore recruited a team of 
four furniture-makers from one of his former suppliers in Guangdong Province. 
     
On the basis of this positive experience Mr Daniel made recruiting labour from China 
an explicit strategy in the expansion of his business empire. Most recently, he hired 14 
workers from China for a construction company he has established with a Chinese 
partner. One of their first projects was to develop a hotel, for which Mr Daniel is 
currently recruiting from China a manager, chef and two masseurs. Indeed, hospitality is 
one of the sectors in which Nigerian and Ghanaian entrepreneurs have been most active 
in recruiting Chinese staff for the skills and professionalism they are seen to offer. 59  
 
Significantly, Chinese partners and workers brought to Ghana and Nigeria by African 
entrepreneurs have gone on to facilitate further Chinese immigration, initiating an 
African-induced process of chain migration and investment. 60  In one of the most 
notable cases, the founder of the ‘China Town’ shopping complex in Lagos, which has 
served as an important gateway for Chinese migrants to Nigeria, was first brought into 
the country from China by Chief Oladipo, a prominent Nigerian businessman and 
politician. Chief Oladipo had established strong business links with China in the 1980s 
and when he wanted to set-up a business to extract salt from the lagoons of Lagos, he 
was able to recruit a Chinese partner, Mr Wu, with the necessary experience.  
 
Mr Wu arrived in Nigeria in 1990 but just as the venture was taking off it collapsed 
when Chief Oladipo was forced into political exile. 61  Observing that there were 
openings for affordable consumer goods in Nigeria, Mr Wu remained in Lagos and 
began trading in products imported from China. Chief Oladipo returned to Nigeria in 
1998 and when he was elected to an important political position the following year, he 
helped Mr Wu to establish Nigeria’s first ‘China Town’ shopping complex in the up-
market Lagos district of Ikoyi. A political ally of Chief Oladipo argues that his intention 
in supporting the ‘China Town’ project was to attract Chinese entrepreneurs who would 
go on to establish factories in Lagos, thereby generating local employment and 
supporting economic development.62 As Mr Wu himself observes, ‘[Y]ou must become 
friends with the Nigerian person. That’s the only way you will be able to move forward 
in Nigeria’.63 However, another respondent involved with the complex points out that it 
became a useful outlet for close relatives of Chief Oladipo involved in the textile 
business, particularly for retailing the substantial volumes of affordable material they 
imported from China.64  
 
                                                 
59 Interview, Ghanaian businessman, Accra, 30 June 2011. 
60 See Dobler, ‘Solidarity, xenophobia’ for how local officials help facilitate Chinese chain migration to 
Namibia. 
61 Interview, Mr Wu, Chinese entrepreneur, Lagos, 9 September 2010. 
62 Interview, Nigerian associate of Chief Oladipo, Lagos, 16t September 2010. 
63  Interview, 9 September 2010. For more on the elite connections of prominent Chinese entrepreneurs 
in Nigeria see Serge Michel, Michel Beuret, and Paolo Woods, China Safari: On the trail of Beijing's 
expansion in Africa (Nation Books, New York, 2009). 
64 Interview, Nigerian associate of ‘China Town’ complex, Lagos, 8 September 2010. 
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As Nyiri explains Chinese private enterprises tend to work through local patrons.65 
Several things may explain this practice. The presence of local persons can assist in the 
struggle to navigate through cultural or ethnic barriers in hostile host societies, and to 
obtain contracts. Investment codes may also require that local residents be stakeholders 
in any employment or partnership arrangements. Research showed that many Chinese 
entrepreneurs found these arrangements frustrating, because these locals were – for all 
intents and purposes - silent partners, who rendered virtually no benefits to the 
business.66  
 
 
Civil Society and the Politicisation of Chinese Migration 
 
The case of town twinning above suggests that organised civil society can play a part in 
encouraging inward investment and, so, in-migration from China. But African civil 
society plays other roles in shaping the nature of and debate over Chinese migration.  
While African civil society had muted responses to China’s activities, a number of 
Africa trade unions and business associations closely critiqued China’s role in national 
economies. For example, the South African TUC was one of the first to recognise the 
threat and organised debates around the future of African clothing and textile 
industries.67 More recently a pan-African trade union project identified a cazualisation 
of labour incumbent on Chinese investment in Africa.68 This was linked to an arbitrary 
determination of wages and benefits, with wages in Chinese firms lower than many 
locally owned and other foreign owned firms. Their research cites Nigeria as an 
example and concludes that, where trade unions are relatively strong, wage rates are 
better. On top of poor wages Chinese firms typically provided only basic benefits and 
then only to the extent that local law required. Not only did Chinese firms generally 
disapprove of unions, but many African workers doubted their respective unions’ ability 
to represent and defend them. 
 
These general trends are highly visible in Zambia. As noted Chinese investment in 
Africa tends to focus on resource extraction and infrastructure projects. In Zambia the 
Chinese SOE Non-Ferrous Company-Africa (NFCA) owned the Chambishi Mine in the 
copperbelt. As an SOE, these enterprises projected the image of single entity. However, 
the region also hosted the Sino-Metals and Beijing General Research Institute of Mining 
and Metallurgy (BGRIMM) – an explosive manufacturing facility that manufactured 
dynamite for the neighbouring mine. A 2005 explosion at the BGRIMM plant killed 52 
Zambians, but left Chinese workers unharmed. A 2006 strike left two protestors fatally 
shot by unknown security personnel and this year a Chinese manager was killed by 
angry workers. The 2006 debacle led the Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia to 
issue a damning report that openly accused Chinese firms of malfeasance and urged 
Zambia’s government and mining companies to develop and enforce better standards.69  
                                                 
65 Pal Nyiri, “Chinese entrepreneurs in poor countries: a transnational ‘middlemen minority’ and its 
futures”. Unpublished paper, 2009. 
66 Anonymous interview data from research project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research 
Council (Ref: RES 062-23-1893) 
67 Ama Amankwah, “23,000 Jobs Gone to the Wind,”  AllAfrica.com, 2005. Accessed June 5th, 2006.  
http://allafrica.com/stories/200510241023.html. 
68 Ching Kwan Lee, “Raw Encounters: Chinese managers, African workers and the politics of casualization 
in Africa’s Chinese enclaves,” The China Quarterly, 199 (2009). 
69 Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, “For Whom the Windfalls? Winners and losers in the privatization of 
Zambia’s copper mines,” (Lusaka:  Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia, 2007).  
http://www.revenuewatch.org/documents/windfalls_20070307.pdf 
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In terms of union responses the rank and file in Lee’s study of the Zambia case see the 
union as relatively powerless and even corrupt.70 Part of this is the legacy of 1980s and 
1990s neoliberal structural adjustment programs that actively undermined African 
organised labour. 71 Moreover union activism is not confined to African labour. The 
harsh working conditions and low pay in some Chinese factories prompted contract 
Chinese workers to engage in protests even though they displayed limited solidarity 
with African workers.72 With respect to Namibia and Mauritania, labour and trade union 
regulations - in theory - govern local and migrant workers. However, the extraterritorial 
effects of China's labour contracts often preclude Chinese workers from benefits that the 
trade union protections in the host country offer. The future looks bleak for organised 
labour in the face of a race to the bottom economic model and a seemingly blind 
willingness of African leaders to encourage foreign investment at any cost (Meagher 
2012). 
 
Business associations have also contested China’s presence. In Uganda the local 
business organizations, mainly the Kampala City Traders Association (KACITA), 
engaged a campaign that challenged unfair competition and shoddy goods. Their 
arguments arose from the perceptions that the Chinese manipulated prices, that the 
Chinese enterprises discouraged other investors, that Chinese practices increased the 
numbers of unemployed, and that the Chinese businesses engaged in tax evasion and 
undermined government revenue.73  Dobler explained how local graft in Namibia - for 
example, bribes to customs officials - enabled Chinese firms to avoid duties, although 
local firms are also subject to such pressures.74 Our research around Chinese SMEs in 
Ghana confirmed this and respondents suggested that paying local officials to expedite 
various official requirements was common, but not of great magnitude and arguably 
equal to similar practices in China.75  
 
Some Ghanaian and Nigerian actors have taken direct action to regulate the activities of 
the Chinese and on occasion have attracted some degree of support from elements of the 
state. Such action has at times produced tangible effects, disrupting and/or constraining 
Chinese enterprise and forcing Chinese actors to adapt their strategies and activities.76 
All of this is especially evident in the response to Chinese traders and their importation 
of ‘cheap’ Chinese consumer goods, which, like Kampala, has been one of the most 
contentious issues related to the Chinese presence in both Ghana and Nigeria.77  
 
                                                 
70 Baah and Jauch, Chinese Investments. 
71 Baah and Jauch, Chinese Investments. 
72 Wong, “Chinese workers”. 
73 Margaret Lee, “Uganda and China: Unleashing the power of the dragon,” in China in Africa, ed. 
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75 Anonymous interview from research project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council 
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In Nigeria, much of the agitation has focused on the ‘China Town’ in Lagos discussed 
earlier. 78  By the time the complex relocated to Ojota in 2002, prominent Nigerian 
manufacturers and the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria had begun to mobilize 
against it. They argued that the importation of cheap and often sub-standard Chinese 
goods was fatally undermining local producers. Indeed, this agitation only increased as 
the new complex became more popular with Chinese traders and African consumers 
alike. ‘They challenged it with all their powers’, recalls a Nigerian closely involved 
with ‘China Town’ since its early days. ‘They did not want the influx of these people 
because they know they will take over all their markets. So it was bad … What they do 
is they go to the authorities, right from the presidency to every arm of the government, 
to say look at these people … their product is not good, their business is not right, cross 
check very well’.79 As a result of such calls by the manufacturing lobby, the Federal 
Government added a number of goods, such as textiles and furniture, to its import 
prohibition list between 2003 and 2004. In late 2005, just nine months after the new 
‘China Town’ was officially commissioned by President Obasanjo’s wife, officers of 
the Nigeria Customs Service descended on the complex, seized banned imported goods 
and closed it for three months. The impact of this action was considerable. The vast 
majority of the Chinese traders lost most or all of their stock. Some simply went out of 
business and returned to China. Many others moved to another country or attempted to 
relocate within Nigeria. For those who remained business never recovered.  
 
While the activities of African trade unions and business associations in contesting the 
Chinese presence reflect material concerns, a worrying trend is that these essentially 
class-based interests are obscured by negative ethnic and racial discourses. Whether 
recently arrived or more established, independent Chinese traders harboured views and 
attitudes that may have long-term implications in local communities. Our research 
revealed cultural assumptions about what they termed ‘blacks’ that seemingly cast the 
indigenes as unsuitable for higher level roles.  For example, these Chinese business 
people tended to limit African workers to menial tasks, say, waiting tables, cleaning 
buildings and door security.  Such employers often cited a lack of trust – or some 
equivalent racist proxy - for employing Chinese labour over Africans. Many felt that 
Chinese productivity was too intense – “Our tempo is too fast for the local people”. Be 
that as it may, a number of Chinese migrants in Angola said, “The Chinese are hated.”80 
Persons with this belief apparently reacted to instances when they felt that locals stole 
from them or acted rudely as signs of their unpopularity. These perceived barriers, in 
turn, seemingly justified their own failure to engage or socialize with the locals.   
 
These assumptions about the other stand in stark contrast to official proclamations 
highlighting the cordial and mutually respectful relations between China and Africa, as 
discussed at the start. At one level, this disjuncture between official and lay Chinese 
opinion should caution against notions of a problem free ‘South-South cooperation.’ 
While state-to-state relations may be founded on a more business-oriented, anti-
imperialist and colour-blind partnership, the actual agents of these relations display 
markedly different views that could effectively limit their ability to integrate in the way 
that promotes investment on the one hand and trust on the other (see Giese and Thiele 
                                                 
78 See also Sola Akinrinade and Olukoya Ogen, ‘Globalization and de-industrialization: South-South neo-
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2012). Some Africans, on the other hand, demonized the Chinese in terms that provided 
fodder for self-serving political ends. Indeed the morally dubious presidential campaign 
of Michael Sata in Zambia was premised on exploiting economic nationalism as a way 
of garnering support. He depicted his impoverished Zambians as the victims of Chinese 
greed. In this way cultural assumptions play into (potential) state policy and might be an 
avenue of future conflict. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The paper sought to analyse the nature of the governance of Chinese migration to Africa. 
We noted that political elites in China and most African states unilaterally trumpet a 
new era of South-South cooperation, with win-win partnerships the order of the day.81 
Indeed, China brings needed infrastructure at concessional rates.82 In return, China’s 
purchase of Africa’s strategic resources raised demand and prices. Even as this 
arrangement disrupts the old North-South order that included aid relations, they occur in 
a no-strings-attached paradigm. They also occur without the discourse of progress or 
postcolonial responsibility that characterised much North-South development 
cooperation.83  That said such discourses enable a material relationship between these 
elites that is closed and unaccountable. We also argued that beyond these bilateral and 
personalised arrangements that non-state and civil society actors were important in 
setting up and regulating these migration flows. While not focusing directly on African 
migration to China, we argued that this circulation of knowledge and people has been a 
major part of the Chinese in Africa story.  
 
Given our starting comments about ‘South-South’ cooperation we can think about these 
migrant relations as beyond economism and ethnocentrism. The dominant ‘China Inc.’ 
assumptions tend to reduce Chinese motivations to singular, rational economic ones, but 
the data – while not disputing this general picture of economic betterment – reveals 
much more complex motives. This required a disaggregation of firm types but also a 
focus on individuals within these organizations. Here we saw not just Africa as a site of 
economic opportunity but as a way of escaping the strictures of Chinese society. It also 
showed longer-term strategies for Chinese engagement in Africa, which refutes the 
short-termist and exploitative assumptions we often hear about. The idea of ethnic 
economies that are internally coherent and enclavic is also misplaced. We saw much 
harder capitalist logics determining business behaviour, complex migrant trajectories 
such that there was no inherent trust within a ‘Chinese’ community, and extensive 
relationships with African businesses. That is not to say that these relationships are 
random, but that ethnicity and nationality are over-determined in the literature on 
Chinese migrant businesses. 
 
In this African agency is important. The data showed Africans negotiating their 
relationships with the Chinese and in some case contesting this presence. This agency is 
found at the individual level, but also within more organised civil society activity and 
within parts of the African state (at both a central and ‘street’ level). However, there is a 
strong class and interest-based dimension to this which needs further analysis – cross-
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cultural friendships – specially business partnerships - tend to be elite-based, civil 
society action is often – but not exclusively - about protecting the class privileges of the 
African petit-bourgeoisie and the labour aristocracy, while the sections of the state that 
benefit from (and so fight for) Chinese investment is a selected elite. 
 
Interactions between Chinese migrants and local populations are often welcome for the 
transparency of the relationship, which is, founded on a clear business footing. The 
Chinese are often either employers or suppliers, and the transactions are devoid of the 
racial connotations attached to European colonization. However, there is evidence that 
there is a reciprocal racism between both communities. On one hand, some Chinese 
exhibit racism and bewilderment at the structures in which African societies are 
organised, while some Africans exhibit a robust xenophobia, which blends easily with 
populist politics. The bewilderment that some expatriate Chinese exhibit suggests that 
ideas of parity and South-South exchange are still in the embryonic stage. Additionally, 
some African attitudes towards the Chinese are steeped in negative stereotypes, even 
though African traders in China noted a better reception than, say, in Europe. As 
employers the Chinese are presented as quite demanding, both towards Africans and 
workers with whom they share ethnicity.  As such, there are genuine dangers of both 
African and Chinese labour being swept up in a race to the bottom.84  
 
Trade union activism shows that, where unions are powerful and able to enforce local 
laws, Chinese firms offer better wages and improved working conditions. It speaks to a 
wider issue as to whether Africa has a China strategy that compares, in any real sense, 
with China’s Africa strategy. Policy responses have been quite weak to date. However, 
elements within African states, like Angola, carved out a hybrid space in which the elite 
collaborates with the Chinese.  
 
Recent calls by the Managing Director of the World Bank set out a clear agenda for 
leveraging more strategic benefits from China’s engagement in the resource sector.85 
She urged the Chinese to make investments consistent with national development 
priorities, which at root means creating jobs. Chinese firms should also demonstrate 
transparency and operate legally and add value by locating more elements of the value 
chain in Africa. They should pay the taxes due and avoid bribery and engage the local 
communities. Although the relations between Chinese enterprises and Africans are 
generally positive, the jury is still out with regard to compliance with Okonjo-Iweala’s 
recommendations. 
 
The spirit of South-South collaboration is partly about breaking free from an enclave 
like mentality and deepening the local footprint that Ferguson argues has been eroded 
not just by Chinese firms but, more generally, by TNCs in Africa.86 In contrast, a focus 
on smaller Chinese firms shows that many are inevitably engaged with local 
communities as suppliers, employers and as cordial neighbours. Given the flexibility 
and the quality of human interaction, many of the positive developments in South-South 
trade will be pragmatically negotiated and achieved at this everyday level. 
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